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The above entitled cases are distinct and separate
suits. By order of the court they have been consolidated
for hearing. This brief covers the· £acts and argument for
Loth cases. The cases are similar but not identical and
the <lifferences will be pointed out in the Statement of
1,aets and in the argument.
1

S'TATEMENT OF F'AC'TS
I)laintiffs have filed their complaints asking for
'vrit~ Q_f mandate to compel the defendant E. Allen Bate·,--- .
111an to 'vithdraw a ruling that plaintiffs may not be employed by their respective Boards of Education and to
compel such Boards to enter into written contracts with
plaintiffs for the school year 1953-1954. Defendants who
are represented by the Attorney General have filed answers. The essential facts relied upon by the plaintiffs
are admitted by the defendants and the questions presented are substantially matters of law.

----·-----

From the complaints and the answers of the defendants the following are the undisputed facts:
(a)

BACKMAN VS. BATEMAN, et al.

Defendant Board of Education of Salt Lake City is a
municipal corporation of the State of Utah whose boundaries are co-extensive with Salt Lake City and the Board
has the statutory function of administering the school
system in Salt Lake City. :The defendant E. Allen Bateman is the State Superintendent of Public Instruction

of
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the State of Utah and as ·such is the executive officer of
the State Board of Education, which Board is charged
'vith the general superintendence of district schools. As
such Superintendent he advises with school officers upon
n1atters inYolving the \Yelfare of schools and when requested he Inust give \Yritten answers to school officeTs
upon all questions concerning school law. This legal obligation is specifically provide·d for by Section 53-3-4, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as follows:
''Decisions by superintendent- Validity. The state superintendent shall advise with superintendents and with school boards and other school
officers upon all matters involving the welfare· of
the schools. He shall when requested by superintendents or other school officers give them written ansvv-ers to all questions concerning the· school
law. His decisions shall be held to be correct and
final until set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction or by subsequent legislation."
The plaintiff Ralph V. Backman is a professional
teacher and has bee·n employed by the defendant Board
of Education from 1926 to and including the school year
1952-1953. His employment has been as a teacher or
supervisor, and since 1948 as the principal of South
High ·school. During all of this time he has held a certificate issued by the State Board of Education as. a requisite to his being employed in the various capacities. At
the present time he holds a certificate of school administration which expires June 30, 1956. These certificates
are issued upon requisites. of merit as provided in ChapSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ter 2, Title 53, Utah c·ode Annotated 1953, and the Rules
and Regulations of the State Board of Education. The
laws of the State of Utah (Section 53-2-21) provide that
no persons shall teach in a public school (which includes
Ptnployntent as a principal) in any school district unless
lu~ has the required certificate from the State Board of
11~ducation. The plaintiff has spent a great deal of time
qualifying hi1nself for his profession, having received an
A.B. degree fro1n the University of Utah, an M.A. degree
fron1 Stanford University, taken postgraduate work consisting of 74lj2 "quarter hours" at Stanford University,
28 '"quarter hours" at the lTniversity of Utah and 18
""quarter hours" at l~tah State Agricultural College.
Under the rules and regulations plaintiff must take certain minimum courses of study during each five-year
period in order to receive a renewal of his certificate.
Defendant Board of Education employs all of its
teachers, supervisors and principals under an annual
\vritten contract and has a tenure policy of renewal of
these contracts when its teaching personnel (including
principals) are doing entirely satisfactory work. Plaintiff's contract expired with the school year 1952-1953 and
he applied for reemployment for the school year 19531954. He was recommended for reemployment by the
S-uperintendent of Salt Lake City schools, and the defendant Board of Education at a regular meeting accepted
the recommendation of its superintendent and voted to
1

employ the plaintiff for the school year 1953-1954. A
question being raised as to the legality of the employment
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of plaintiff, a contrart 'Yas not entered into by the defendant Board of Education. Pursuant to the above mentioned statutory provision (Section 53-3-4) an opinion a.s
to the legality of employn1ent of the· plaintiff was subnlitted to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction.
The factual situation necessitating this opinion is that
plaintiff is a brother of Le·Grand P. Backman who now
is and sinee 1939 has been a me·mber of the Board of
Education of Salt Lake City. LeGrand P. Backman did
not vote upon the question of the employment of the plaintiff. Exhibits ~~ D" and "E" are the letters addressed to
the State Superintendent and his answer regarding the
question of employment of plaintiff. As appears from
these exhibits the State· Superintendent, on the advice·
of the Attorney General, gave the opinion that plaintiff
could not be employed by the Salt Lake City Board of
Education. Plaintiff was then notified that upon the ·sole
ground of the opinion of the State Superintende·nt he
would not be employed for the coming school year. Exhibit "F" is the letter addressed to plaintiff so advising
him.
Under Section 53-6-8, Utah C'Ode Annotated 1953,
it is provided that the· members. of each board of education shall fix their own compensation to be received for
their services and that such -compensation shall not
exceed $100.00 per year in city ·school districts. The
Board of Education of Salt Lake City has fixed its
compensation for the year 1953-1954 at $100.00 per
annum.
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There were approximately 125 teachers employed
1n the State of Utah during the school year 1952-195-3
\vho~P vosition with regard to employment for the school
yPar 195:3-1954 is the same as that of the plaintiff and
who will be unable to secure employment under the
ruling of the defendant f)uperintendent E. Allen Batenlan. Nubstantially every school district in the state
1s affected by the ruling of the State Superintendent.
Plaintiff has been employed by the defendant Board
of Education for 27 years and during such period he
has become familiar with the practices, problems and
procedures of the Salt Lake City Board, has an established good will with such defendant, and plaintiff may
not be able to secure employ1nent in another school district. It is also admitted that no other district in the
State of Utah has a high school of comparable size with
the high schools of Salt Lake City and no other district
pays as high a salary for the position of principal of a
high school. Plaintiff is 49 years of age, has been a
resident of Salt Lake City all of his life, has five children
and owns his own home in Salt Lake City. There is
established in the Salt Lake City School District a Local
Public School Teachers' Retir.ement Association of which
every teacher employed under a written contract by the
Board of Education is by law a member. :The funds for
said retirement association are supplied by deductions
from the salaries of teachers, such deductions at the
present time being ·2% on a maximum of $2,500.00 and
by an equal amount paid into the association by the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Board of Education. Plaintiff has contributed to such
association during all the tilne he has been e·mploye·d by
the defendant Board and to be eligible for retirement
benefits fron1 the association he Inust ha:ve taught 30
years and must be a member of the association at the
time of retirement. If he is not employed he is not a
1nember of the association. Retirement benefits at the!
present tune are $600.00 per annum. If plaintiff cannot
continue his employment by defendant Board of Education all benefits of the Local Teachers' Retirement Association, including the an1ounts plaintiff has paid into the
association will be lost.
(b)

TANNER VS. BATEMAN, et al.

In the case of Tanner :vs. E. Allen Bate1nan and the
Board of Education of Ogden ·City, the facts are similar to
the Backman case except as to the following matters.
The Boa.rd of Education of Ogdern City has voted that
the members shall receive no pay for the fiscal arnd school
year 1953-1954. Mr. T'anner holds a life diploma issue·d
by the State Board of Education which needs no renewal
and can be canceled only for cause or the failure of Mr.
Tanner to be employed as a teacher for a period of fi:ve
years. The Board of Education of Ogden City, as in the
case of Salt Lake· 'City, has a Local T'eachers' Retirement
Association. Unless plaintiff is a member of the association at the time of retirement he will lose all benefits
of the association including the amounts paid in by him.
T·ermination of employment terminates membership.
Payments at the present time are 1% of $2,500.00 per
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annmn and the retirement benefits now being paid are
$~80.00 per year. Mr. Tanner is 61 years of age, has
taught continuously since 1922, and has taught a total
of 33Y2 years all of which has been in the Ogden s.chools.
He i~ now teaching only the subject of biology in which
subject he has specialized, and it is only in the large·r
s<·hools that a teacher can be e1nployed to teach one
subject exclusively.
In the Ogden School District and generally throughout the State of Utah teachers' pay is on a basis of
seniority, and l\fr. Tanner has reached the maximum
pay per1nitted by reason of seniority. If he cannot continue his employment in Ogden City and secures employment as a teacher in another district he will lose a portion
of this seniority and will receive less than the maximum
pay.
Plaintiff Mathias C. Tanner is a brother to N. Russell Tanner who has been a member of the Board of
Education of Ogden City since 1945. N. Russell Tanner
did not participate in or vote upon the question of
employment of Mathias C. Tanner for the school year
1953-1954. Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" are similar in
form and substance to Exhibits "D", "E" and "F'" in the
Backman case.
The question rn both cases is whether or not the
plaintiffs may be employed in the school districts of Salt
Lake City and O·gden respectively. It is the contention of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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both plaintiffs that if they may not be so employed they
have been denied a right to "vhich they are entitled and
from w·hich they have been unlawfully excluded by the
defendants.
Both plaintiffs have met all requirements for
en1ployment by the defendant boards and the question
is whether such e1nployment is illegal by reason of the
1953 amenmnent to Section 52-3-1, Utah Code Annotated
1953, being Senate Bill 235. Plaintiffs contend that they
are not prohibite·d from the employment by such amendment and that by the ruling of defendant E. Allen Bateman and the refusal of defendant boards of education
they have been denied a right to which they are entitled
and from which they have been unlawfully excluded.
(!tallies throughout this brief are plaintiffs'.)

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED· UPON
I. THE ANTI-NEPOTISM STATUTE IS UNCONSTITU-

TIONAL AS APPLIED TO TEACHERS AND OTHER
EMPLOYEES OF BOARDS OF EDUCATION REQUIRED
BY LAW TO HOLD CERTIFICATES ISSUED BY THE
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.

(a) Question involved is one of police power of the

state und,er the state a.nd federal constitutions.
(b) Plaintiff has a.n established and vested right to

seek employm.ent and make contracts in amy
school district of the state, which right may not
be interfere_d with by statute.
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(c) The control arnd supervision of the public sc·hool

system is by our constitution vested in the State
Board of Education and the anti-nepotism law
is in conflict with such provision.
(d) ~There is no necessity in the interest of the public

welfare for a;n anti-nepotism statute which prohiiYlts the employm-ent of teachers and other persownel required by law to hold certificates issued
by the J.S1 tate Board of Education.
(e) The anti-nepotism law is arbitrary and oppres-

sive and unduly restricts the liberty of plaintiffs
guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.
II. ANTI-NEPOTISM STATUTE SHOULD BE CONSTRUED
SO AS NOT TO APPLY TO TEACHERS AND OTHER
EMPLOYEES OF BOARDS OF EDUCATION REQUIRED
BY LAW TO HAVE CERTIFICATES OR DIPLOMAS ISSUED BY THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.

(a) If so construed the anti-nepotism statute is in

conflict with Section 53-2-15, Utah Code A'YIIfbotated 1953.
(b) Statutes must be construed in the light of their

intent and purposes.
(c) Where there are two possible construc;tions to

be given a statute one of which resUlts in the
statute being held unconstitutional, the alternative construction should be given.
III. WHERE BOARD OF EDUCATION RECEIVES NO PAY
THE ANTI-NEPOTISM STATUTE IS NOT APPLICABLE.
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ARGUMENT
I. THE ANTI-NEPOTISM STATUTE IS UNCONSTITU-

TIONAL AS APPLIED TO TEACHERS AND OTHER
EMPLOYEES OF BOARDS OF EDUCATION REQUIRED
BY LAW TO HOLD CERTIFICATES ISSUED BY THE
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.

For convenience· we have divided this argument into
subheadings (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e). We think there
is a logical segregation of points but the matters are
necessarily overlap·ping and authorities cited under one
of these subdivisions may be persuasive under another
subdivision or under all of them.
(a) Question involved is one of police power of the
state under the state and federal constitutions.

The anti-nepotism statute provides as follows:
"52-3-1. Employment of relatives prohibited.-It is unlawful for any person holding any
position the compensation for which is paid out
of public funds to retain in employment or to
employ, appoint, or vote for the ap·pointment of,
his or her father, mother, husband, wife, son,
daughter, sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew,
niece, first cousin, mother-in-law, father-in-law,
brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law in or to any position or employment,
when the salary, wages, pay or compensation of
such appointee, is to be paid out of any public
funds; and it is unlawful for such appointee to
accept or to retain such employment in all cases
where the direct power of employment or appointment to such position is or can be exercised by any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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person within the degress of consanguinity or
affinity herein specified, or by a board or group
of which such person is a member."
Se(~tion

1, Article I of our State C·onstitution pro-

vides:
"All men have the inherent and inalienable
right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties

"
Section 7, Article I of ou~ State Constitution provides;
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law."
Amendment XIV of the Federal Constitution provides:

". . . No state shall 1nake or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."
Under the foregoing constitutional provisions liberty
includes the right to work and to sell one's services
whe·rever and under what conditions he may choose.
This right cannot be interfered with except for the public
welfare and the evil to be corrected must be of a substantial nature before the libeTty of citizens may be
restricted.
In the case of Weaver v-s. Palmer Bros. Oompa;ny,
270 U. S. 402, 70 L. Ed. 654, the State o:f Pennsylvania
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had passed a statute prohibiting the use of '·'shoddy" as,
a material to be used in 1nattresses. The Unite·d States
Supreme Court made the following statements in holding
the statute unconstitutional as an infringement of
personal libeTty:
""Legislative determina.tions express or implied are entitled to great weight; but it is always
open to interested parties to shovv that the legislature has transgressed the limits of its power.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
413, 67 L. ed. 322, 325, 28 A.L.R. 1321, 43 Sup·. Ct.
Rep. 158. Invalidity may be shown by things
which will be judicially noticed ( Quong Wing v.
Kirkendall, 223 U. S·. 59, 64, 56 L. ed. 350, 352·, 32
Sup. Ct. Rep. 192), or by facts established by evidence."
"Shoddy-filled comfortables made by appellee
are useful articles for which there is much
demand. And it is a matter of public concern that
the production and sale of things necessary or
convenient for use should not be forbidden. They
are to be distinguishe·d from things that the state
is deemed to have power to suppress as inherently
dangerous.
"Many states have enacted laws to regulate
bedding for the protection of health. Legislation
in Illinois (Laws 1915, p. 375) went beyond mere
regulation and prohibited the sale of secondhand
quilts or comfortables even when sterilized or
when remade from sterilized secondhand materials. In People v. Weiner, 271 Ill. 74, L.R.. A. 1916C,
775, 110 N. E. 870, Ann. Cas.1917C, 1065, the state
supreme court held that to prohibit the use of
material not inherently dangerous and that might
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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be rende·red safe. by reasonable regulation transgresses the constitutional protection of personal
and property rights."
"The constitutional guaranties may not be
1nade to yield to mere convenience. Schlesinge·r
v. Wisconsin, decided March 1, 1926, 270 U. S.
230, ante, 557, 43 A. L. R. 1224, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep.
260. The business here involved is legitimate and
useful; and, while it is subject to all reasonable
regulation, the absolute prohibition of the use of
shoddy in the manufacture of comfortables is
purely arbitrary and violates the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment. Adams v. Tanner,
244 U. S.. 590, 596, 61 L. ed. 1336, 1343, L.R.A.
1917F, 1163, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 662, Ann. Cas.
1917D, 973; ~I eyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390,
67 L. ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep.
625; Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S.
504, 68 L. ed. 813, 32 A.L.R. 661, 44 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 412."
Freedom of contract was discussed by this court in
the case of Block & Griff vs. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76
Pac. 22 (at pages 395 and 396 of the Utah Report).
"The appellant, however, claims that the
enactment interferes with and abridges his
inalienable rights, as well as those of others in
like situation, subjects of this commonwealth; and
for his and their protection against the consequences which naturally flow from such an enactment he ap·peals to section 1, art. 14, of Amendments to the Constitution of the United States,
which, on this subject, p·rovides: 'No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
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States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' F:or like
reasons he appeals to section 1, art. 1, of the Constitution of this State, which inter alia, provides;
'All men have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to
acquire, possess and protect prope·rty; . . . to
assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances;' and also to
section 7 of article 1, which provides: 'No persons
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.' ·These constitutional provisions constitute the supreme law of the commonwealth upon this subject. To that law the executive, the legislative, and the judicial departments
of the government alike must bow obedience, a.s
well as every subject. It forbids the abridge·ment
by the State of the p·rivileges and immunities of
all citizens. Under its mandate no person can be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, and every person is entitled to the
equal protection of the laws, and may acquire
property, possess and protect it, as well as defend
his life and liberty. ~These are inherent and
inalienable rights of citizens, and are constitutional guaranties. An enactment, therefore, which
deprives a person arbitrarily of his property, or
of som.e part of his personal liberty, is just as
much inhibited by the supreme law as one which
would deprive him of life. And 'liberty,' in the
sense in which the term is here employed, is not
restricted to m.ere freedom from imprisonment,
but it embraces the right of a person to use his
God-given powers, employ his faculties, exercise
his judgment in the affairs of life, a.nd to be free
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in the enjoyment and disposal of his acquisitions,
subject only to such restraints as are imposed by
the law of the land for the public welfa,re. The
word 'liberty,' as thus employed in the Constitutions and understood in the United States, is a
term of comprehensive scope. It embraces not
only freedom from servitude and from imprisonrnent and arbitrary restraint of person, but also
all our religious, civil, political, and personal
rights, including the right in each subject to purchase, hold, and sell or dispose of property in the
same way that his neighbor may; and of such
liberties no one can be deprived except by due
process of law."
The following statement was made by this court in
the case of McGrew vs. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah
203, 85 P. 2d. 608, the case involving the Utah Minimum
Wage Law, (page 208 of the Utah Report):

"Thus one may be said to have a special property in his profession or calling by means of w·hich
he makes his support, and he can be deprived of
it only by due process of law. Blair v. Ridgely,
41 Mo. 63, 173, 97 Am. Dec. 248. We refer to this
because it is necessary to keep this broad and true
meaning of property in mind when considering
the constitutional questions here presented. The
right to work, the right to engage in gainful occupations, the right to receive compensation for
one's work are essentially property rights. So
too is the right to enjoy the benefits resulting
from the work of one so employed. So also the.
right to engage in commerce or in legitimate husiness is p~rop·erty. ''
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The ca8e of State ex rel Cox vs. the Boa.rd of Ed.uca.tion of Salt Lake City, 21 lTtah 401, involved the question
of 'vhether or not the school board could require vaccination of pupils as a condition of attendance at school. 'The
court held that under the epidemic conditions of that day
such a requirement 'vas valid. The following however is
a quotation by the court as to the extent of the police
po".,.er:
'· ~·The police power of a State is recognized
by the courts to be one of wide sweep·. It is exercised by the State in order to promote the health,
safety, comfort, morals, and welfare of the public.
The right to exercise this power is said to be
inherent in the people of every free government.
It is not a grant derived from or under any written constitution. It is not, however, without limitation, and it can not be invoked so as to invade
the fundamental rights of a citizen. As a general
proposition, it may be asserted that it is the pro:vince of the Legislature to decide when the exigency exists for the exercise of this power, but
as to what are the subjects which come within it
is evidently a judicial question.' Champer v. City
of Greencastle, 138 Ind., 339; Blue v. Beach, 56
N.E. Rep. 87; State v. Gebhardt, 145 Ind. 439."
The following quotation is taken from the footnote
page 1'228 of Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Eighth
Edition, Volume Two:
'' ':The police power is not unlimited ...
Wherever it is irnvoked in aid of any purpose of
legislation1, such purpose or legislation must bear
some de finite a.nd tangible relation to the health,
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comfort, morals, welfare, or safety of the public.'
Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 128 Atl. 50,
38 A. L. R. 1455. See also Miller v. Board of
l:>ublic Works, 195 c·al. 477, 234 Pac. 381, 38 A. L.
1~. 1479."

The following statement is from the same text, pages
1236 and 1237:
"Freedom of Contract. F'reedom of contract
is not absolute. It is subject to reasonable legislative regulation in the interest of public health,
safety and morals, and, in a sense ·not resting
merely on expediency, the public welfare. But
restraints upon such freedom must not be arbitrary or unreasonable. Freedom is the general
rule and restraint the exception. The legislative
authority to abridge can be justified only by
exceptional circumstances."
We also refer to the case of H untworth vs. Ta'l1!ner,
152 P. 523, quoted at page 30 of this brief and the
case of Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 61 L. ed. 1336,
quoted at page 33. In the first case the Supreme Court
of the State of Washington held that a statute prohibiting employment agencies from collecting fees from
employees did not apply to an agency devoted exclusively to the securing of employment for teachers. The
second case held the same statute unconstitutional as
applied to any employment agency. The United States
Supreme Court stated that employment agencies were
legitimate businesses which could not be prohibited under
the police power. The court found that the p·rohibition
of the collection of a fee from the employee was in effect
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a destruction of the business. The quotations from these
cases at pag-es 30, 33 of this brief further outline the
limitation upon the police power of the state.
It is our pos,ition that the anti-nepotism law when
applied to personnel employed by school boards who
a.re required to hold and who do hold certificates issued
by the State Board of Education is unconstitutional.
(b) Plaintiff has a;n established and vested right to

seek employment and· make contracts in any
school district of the state, which right may not
be interfered with by statute.
Section 53-2-15 provides for the issuance of certificates and diplomas to professional teachers and states
that:
"/Such certificates and diplomas shall be valid
in any school district of the state in the department of instruction or supervision for which they
are issued."
In the case of Scheibner vs. Baer (Pa. 1896) 34 Atl.
193, the State s.uperintendent attempted to revoke· a
teacher's certificate without g-iving the statutory ten
days' notice and an op,portunity to be heard. The court
held that the certificate was a right which could not be
interfered with without due process of law. The court
stated:
" 'It is clear that any certificate granted to a
teacher is a "license" (see section 12) to him to
pursue a certain avocation, and to seek a certain
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public ernployment, which without it, he cannot
pursue or seek. That right, during the period for
whieh the certificate is granted to him, is a valuable property in his hands, just as a right to
practice as an attorney of a court is property in
1he hands of him who has been admitted to it.
Ex r>arte Steinrnan, 95 Pa. St. 220, 237. The
annulment of a teacher's certificate is the destruction of his property. No man, in this state,
can be deprived of his property except by a proceeding judicial in its nature, and as such involving as an indispensable requisite an opportunity
of being heard. Id.; Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. St.
86, 91; Craig v. Kline, 65 Pa. St. 399, 413;
Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 479, 485; Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Pa. St. 80, 89. That opportunity the act of 1854 (section 41) secures to a
teacher in the provision for notice to him previous
to the annulment of his certificate; for, as was
pointed out by Mr. Justice Field in Windsor v.
· MeVeigh, 93 U. S. 27 4, the requirement of notice
necessarily implies the right to appear and to be
heard. Remembering that the effect of an annulment of a certificate, in the case of one whose profession is that of a public school teacher, and who
has passed the period of life when he can turn his
hand to anything, means the destruction of his
livelihood, it is surely true that the notice and
opportunity for hearing prescribed by the statute
are conditions p.recedent to the exercise of the
power of annulment given by it.' "
(c) The control and supervision of the public school

system is by our constitution vested in the State
Board of Education and the anti-nepotism law
is m conflict with such provision.
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Se·ction S,

~\rtirle

X of our constitution provides:

HT·he general control and supervision of the
public school system shall be vested in a State
Board of Education, consisting of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and such other persons as the Legislature· may provide."
The framers of the constitution obviously intended
that a State Board of Education should regulate the
public school system and such matters as constitute
Hgeneral control and supervision" may not be taken away
from the State Board by an arbitrary statute disqualifying teachers holding certificates. 'The Legislature has,
pursuant to the State Constitution, placed the matter of
qualification of teachers in the hands of the State Board
of Education. 'The Legislature is prohibited by the constitution from interfering and the anti-nepotism statute,
as applied to certified employees of school boards, is in
violation of the constitution.
(d) There is no necessity in the interest of the

public wel fa.re for an a.nti-nepotism statute
which prohibits the employment of teachers a.nd
other personnel required by la.w to hold. certificates issued by the State Board of Education.
As shown by the authorities cited under subdivision
(a) above an interference with the right of employment
is justified only when there is some public necessity.
Since by constitutional and statutory provisions the only
persons who may be employed as teachers or supervisors
in school districts are those who have been approved and
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certified by the State Board of Education there is no
need for an anit-nepotism law covering such personnel.
rrhe following statutes relate to the issuance of certifieateH by the Board of Education. References are to Utah
Code Annotated 1953.
"53-2-12. General Powers and duties.- The
general control and supervision of the public
school system is vested in the state board of education. It shall adopt rules and regulations to eliminate and prevent all unnecessary duplication o.f
work or instruction in any branch or division of
the public school system and shall require the
governing boards of all hranches and divisions
of the public school system to put the same into
operation."
"53-2-15. Certificates and diplomas - Professional teachers - Employees of local boards
of education. - The state board of education is
hereby authorized and empowered to issue professional teachers' certificates and diplomas of high
school, junior high school, grammar, primary and
kindergarten grade ; and also to issue superintendents' certificates and diplomas and supervisors' certificates and diplomas. Such certificates and diplomas shall be valid in 0Jf11Y schoo.Z
district of the state in the departm-ent of ins~truc
tion or supervision for which they are issued.
"The state board of education is also authorized and empowered to issue certificates to pe·rsons regularly employed by local boards of education in classifications of service in the public
school system other than those specified in the
preceding paragraph."
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'~53-2-16.

Diplon1as valid for life - Qualifications of recipients. - Diplomas of ·all grades,
including superintendents' and supervisors' diplomas, shall be issued only to professional
teachers, superintendents or supervisors who
have reached the age of twenty-three years, have
had five years of successful teaching or superYising experience in this state, exhibit satisfactory
evidence of good Inoral character, are free from
serious infectious or heredi ta.ry disease and are
found to possess the requisite scholarship· and
culture. These diplomas are valid for life, urnless
recoked for cau,se._ or unless the holder allows a
space of five consecuti.ve years to pass without
following the pursua.nt of teaching or supervising."

"53-2-17. Certificates - How long valid Issuance. - Certificates shall be of such rank
and classification as the state hoard of education
shall determine, and shall be valid for a period of
not to exceed five years. Certificates may be issued to app~licants who have not had the teaching
or supervising experience in this state required
for diplomas."
"53-2-18. Scholarship qualifications of ap·plicants - Change. - The state board of education shall determine the scholarship. and training
required of applicants for diplomas, and the
scholarship, training and experience required of
applicants for certificates; provided, tha.t any
change made by the state board of education by
which the scholarship·, training or experience required for any certificate or d:iploma. is increased
shall be a.nnounced when made, and shall be effective not less than one year from the date when
such change is awnounced."
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4

'53-2-19. Certificates and diplomas from certain institutions acceptable. - Certificates and
di plo1nas issued by the school of education of the
LT niversi.ty of Utah, when indorsed by the chairuuul of the state board of education, shall have
the force of certificates and diplomas of corresponding rank issued ·by the state board of education. rrhe state board of education may accept
er<~dits, certificates and diplomas of other institutions of learning as meeting in whole or in part
the require1nents for teachers' certificates and
diplo1nas, if the work of such institutions of learning is found to conform to standards fixed by the
state board of education."
•'53-2-20. Applicants fro1n other states. The state board of education 1nay issue certificates and diplon1as to persons holding certificates
and di plo1nas fron1 other states; provided, such
certificates and diplomas are found to be of equal
rank 'Yith those issued by this state; and provided
further, that applicants for diplomas shall have
taught successfully at least five years, of which
at least two years shall have been in Utah."
"53-2-21. Teachers, supervisors and superintendents to have certificate. - No person shall

teach in a public school or be employed as supervisor or superintendent in any school district in
this state and receive compensation therefor out
of any public jtunds who a.t the time of
rendering such service or at the time of such emr
ployment is not the holder of a certificate issued
in accordance with the regulations of the state
boa.rd of education; provided, that this section
shall not apply to substitutes employed to take
the place of regular teachers who are temporarily
absent."
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"53-2-:2~.

Exa1nination of applicants. - The
state board of education 1na:y deter1nine by exainination or othervvise the qualifications of applicants for certificates and diplomas, prepare exan1ination questions, appoint representatives in
the seve·ral districts of the state to conduct examinations, and prescribe all necessary rules and
regulations relative to examinations."
H53-2-23. Examiners - Compensation. The state board of education may appoint persons
of eminent educational ability to assist in the
preparation of examination questions and the
grading of examination papers and fix the compensation for such p·ersons, which shall be paid
from 1noney appropriated for the p·urpose upon
vouchers approved by the state board of examiners."
"53-2-24. Revocation of certificates Grounds. - The state board of education shall revoke for immoral or unprofessional condu.ct or
evident ~unfitness for teaching state diploma-s a.nd
state certificates issued under the provisions of
this chapter."
"53-2-25. Teachers in district schools 1nust
be physically and mentally fit.- No person shall
be employed by any board of education as teacher
in any school district in this state and receive
compensation therefor out of any public funds
who is mentally or physically disqualified to perform successfully the: duties of a teache-r, by reason of tuberculosis or any other chronic or acute
disease. Any board of education may require any
applicant for employment as a teacher to furnish
satisfactory evidence· tha.t he or she is mentally
and physically qualified for the duties of a
teacher."
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Exhibit "A" (pamphlet attached to complaint consisting of 35 pages) contains the rules and regulations
adopted by the State Board of Education covering requireinenb.; for teachers, supervisors and superintendent:--;. Pages 3 to 18 cover the significant matters relating
to principals and high school teachers, in which classification plaintiffs fall. We suggest that these rules and
regulations be earefully read if theTe is any question as
to whether or not the requirements have been well considered. F'or a statement of the history and evaluation
of the requirement~ of the State Board of Education we
suggest that the court take judicial notice of "The History of Public Education in Utah" by John Clifton
~foffitt, ( 1946) pages 308 to 313. The author concludes
with the following general statement as to the requirements in 1946 which are substantially the present requirements as outlined in Exhibit "A".
"Current practice in teacher certification. No teacher, supervisor or superintendent may be
employed to work in an educational capacity of
public school work ,and receive compensation unless he or she is 'the holder of a certificate issued
in accordance with the regulations of the State
Board of Education.' The state board has operated on a long-time planning program and
throughout the years of its existence has raised
the standards to their present status. The present
requirements were announced sufficiently in advance to p·ermit teachers to pre·pare themselves
to meet the higher demands for ·certification.
Present regulations became· effective September
1, 194'2. The teachers are certified in three major
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categories: general secondary, general eleinentary and special subject certificates. First and
second class rertifieates are awarded in each of
the above rlassifications. First class certificates
are valid for five years and renewable for fiveyear periods upon the completion of seven and
one-half quarter hours of acceptable upper division college \York. Second class certificates are
awarded in eaeh of the three, categories, and are
valid for t'vo years. Likewise, these are renewable
on the completion of seven and one-half hours of
credit of upper division college work. The second
class certificates are issued to those individuals
'vho have training below the standard established
and effective September 1, 1942, and pertains particularly to those teaehers or teacher candida,tes
required to hold certificates who have not obtained a Bachelor's Degree or the equivalent
thereof. General secondary certificates are, valid
in four-year high schools, and in junior and senior high schools, and general elementary certificates are valid in all elementary grades. In addition to four years of college training, upon first
receiving the certificate the candidate is required
to present speeified training, ineluding major
areas of study. Music, art, and the· commercial
subjects may be taught by those who hold special
subject certificates. Requirements for re~newal
are comparable to those for the general certificate. In addition to the general and special subject certificates listed, librarians, coordinators, industrial arts teachers and teachers of vocational
agriculture, vocational trade, and industrial education, as well as those teaching home economics,
are awarded certificates requiring special study.
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"'Those working in administrative and supervi:..;ory positions are required to hold appropriate
<'Prtificates in their field. All public school superint(~ndentH, and all principals of schools with three
or 1nore teachers, must hold administrative certif'i('ate:..;. Likewise, supervisors in both secondary
:..;<· hools and elernentary schools should hold certifieates appropriate to the school level they serve.
Ad1ninistrative and supervisory certification is
given upon the basis of experience and training.
"In order to stimulate professional growth,
the :..;tate board of education has discontinued the
forn1er practice of issuing life diplomas, but recognizes tho~e that have been awarded preceding
the date of the present policy - providing the
holder of such a diploma does not permit five consecutiYe years to elapse without serving as a regular teacher or supervisor. The ·state board at its
own choice 1nay revoke or refuse to issue any certificate for just cause. During 1945, state appointed representative groups were at work preparatory to making further n1odification in all
divisions of certification."
Fron1 the foregoing and an exan1ination of Exhibit
''A" it is apparent that the State Board of Education actively supervises and regulates the issuance of teaching
and supervisory certificates. A high standard is maintained and the State Board does all of the "policing"
necessary in the interest of public welfare. There is no
legitimate basis under the police power of the state to
interfere with the supervision of the public school system
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by the State Board of Education or to nullify the statutory provision \Yhich 8tates that certificates issued by the
State Board shall be valid in all school districts.

In addition to the control and supervision by the
State Board of Education 've consider it worthy of notice
that lmder Section 52-3-1 (the anti-nepotisin law) prior
to its amendn1ent by the 1953 Legi,slature the Board member related to the teacher was prohibited from voting on
the employment of such teacher. It was therefore a requirement that a majority of the Board should vote for
the employment of the teacher without the vote of the
related member. This has been an additional safeguard
in the employment of teaching personnel.
(e) The anti-nepotism law is arbitrary

art~d

oppressive arnd u.nduly restricts the liberty of plaintiffs
guaranteed by the stat·e and federal constitutions.

The ease of Huntworth v. Tanner (Wash. 1915) 152
Pac. 5·23, was an action by the plaintiff doing business as
the Pacific Teachers Agency to enjoin the defendant,
Attorney General, from enforcing a law prohibiting employment agencies fro1n charging the employees for services in securing employment. The court construed the
st~atute

as not app,lying to employment agencies re-

stricted to the employment of teachers and an injunction
was granted. On the question of statutory construction
and the police po,ver of the state, the court said :
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"If thus construed, it might well be questioned whether the law would be constitutionalgranting for present purposes that the act in
wholP or in part does no violence to the fourteenth
alltencltnent to the c·onstitution of the United
~~Hates, a question upon which we make no ruling;
for an act of the character of the one now before
us, in so far as it affects individuals who may
have eonducted a legitimate business fairly and
honestly, would be clearly unconstitutional unless
it can be said that the abuses growing out of the
conduct of a certain kind of a business are so
great as to warrant a holding that the general
welfare demands that the innocent must limit or
give up their calling for the common good. Such
laws are sustained, not because a business is in
itself unlawful, but because of the abuses attending its operation. Consequently it is in the abuses,
and not the business that the law is rooted. The
police power touches those things which offend
against the welfare of society. It finds no resting
place in that which is inoffensive. If the act be
construed as to include 'any person' who may accept a fee for procuring employment for another
without qualification and without reference to
the mischiefs declared in the preamble and sought
to be remedied by the st~atute, it would be, an unreasonable restraint, and probably be overturned
in its entirety.
"'The test of the (police) powe~r is found in
the effect the pursuit of the calling has upon the
public weal, rather than in the inherent nature of
the calling itself.' State ex rel. D~avis-Smith v.
Claus en, 65 Wash. 1'56, 19'2, 117 Pac. 1101, 1112
(37 L.R.A. (N."S.) 466)."
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In the case of Saville v. Corless, ±G Utah 495, 151
Pac. 51, this court held uncon·stitutional as not within
the police po,Yer of the state a statute requiring mercantile and cormnercial institutions to rlose at 6:00 o'clock
P.:\1. of every business day excepting six days prior to
Christmas. The follo,ving is a portion of the, c.ourt's
op1n1on:
._,,. . e think it also offends against constitutional rights to enjoy, acquire and possess property, the most valuable of which is that of alienation, the right to vend and sell. There are things
the sale of 'vhich may be restricted, regulated, or
even prohibited by the Legislature, and enterprises which may be restricted, regulated and controlled. But such legal interference must rest on
the police power of the state to promote or p~re
serve public health, public m·orals, public safety,
public convenience, and general welfare. The· act
here has no such purpose and in no sense tends
to promote or preserve public health, morals,
peace, order, safety, convenience, comfort or welfare. It is but an arbitrary and an unwarranted
interference with a merchant's business. One or a
number of 1nerchants may desire to close their
stores at six o'clock. They may do that. But they,
by legisl~ation, cannot eompel every other merchant to close at the sa1ne hour. They can run
their own business, but not their neighbor's. So
employees, for motives of their own, may desire
all store~s to close at a certain hour. But their employers, whose business and property is affected,
have a voice in that. ·They, if they choose, may
consent to close. But they cannot, by legislation,
or otherwise, be coerced to do so. An employee
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1uay refuse to work for another after six o'clock.
r:L,hat i~ hi~ right. But he may not by legislation

or otherwise, vrevent his enlploye; from conducting hi~ own business in person, or with other emplo~·ees who are willing to work for him. That is
an unwarranted interference with the rights of
others. All thi~ is so self-evident and fundamental
as not to ad.Init of argument. Most sweeping
a1uenu1n<lnts to both the federal and state C:onstit utions are essential to sanction such legislation as indica ted in either the title or body of the
act hPfore us. If there be one thing more than
others to be guarded against encroachment it is
the federal and state Constitutions. These we are
all sworn to protect and defend. To disobey them
i.')· to jeopardize fundanzental rights and liberties

of the }Jeople, inzperil their welfare and happiness,
and to Jnenace tlze rery existence of governments."
In the case of State ex rel Robinson v. Keefe (Fla.
1933) 149 So. 638, the plaintiffs, school teachers, brought
suit to nullify the anti-nepotisn1 statute prohibiting the
en1ployn1ent of school 'teachers related to members of
boards of education. ..A.s shown in another portion of this
brief (page 36) the court construed the statute as not
applying to teachers holding certificates from the state
board of education. However the court indicated that
an anti-nepotism statute which does apply to teachers
holding certificates "'"ould not be within the constitutional
powers of the Legislature. The court stated:
"The requirements of this separate code of
laws (with regard to teachers' certificates) afford
adequate protection against appointments other
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than upon proved 1nerit, U'hich is all tha,t a,n •a.ntinepotis·m' law can constitnti.onally be snppose.d
to cover and still re1na.in within the police powef·
nnder the guise of 1clzich it is enacted."
.A. t this point

"\Ye

refer the court to subdivision (a)

above "\Yhich sets forth cases defining the limit of the
police power of the state. \\T e particularly call attention
to the case of . .-ldanz.s v. Tan;ner, 2-!4: U. S·. 590, 61 L. Ed.

1336 'vhich involved the same statute as the Washington
case of Huntworth v. T'anner, supra. The United States
Supreme Court in this case held the Washington statute
prohibiting an en1ployment agency from charging the
employee (whether teachers or any e1nployees) for its
services unconstitutional as an interference with individual liberty.
There is no necessity in the public welfare to prohibit the employment of a teacher or supervisor having a
license to teach in the form of a certificate issued by the
state board of education.~ lAs stated in the case of State
ex rel. Robinson v. Keefe, supra, anti-nepotism statutes
are for the purpose of preventing the employment of incompetent relatives. Since the question of qualification
is adequately handled by the State Board of Education
the anti-nepotism statute when applied to school teachers
is an unwarranted interference with liberty, is arbitrary
and a violation of the privileges of citizens.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34
We again refer the court specifically to the case of
._'-{clteilnu~r r. Baer quoted at page 19 of this brief where
it is held that the certificate of the teacher is a "license"
whieh eannot he revoked without just cause and by due
p ro<'e:-;~ of law.
As a further counnent we mention the present situation of the schools of this state of which this -court may
takP judicial notice. rreachers are leaving the State of
l . tah becau~e of lo\v salaries and uncertainty of contracts. Obviously the effect of disqualifying a large number of teachers fron1 teaching in the districts where they
have become well established will result in more te·achers
leaving the state or changing their profession or occupation. There 1nay he so1ne inducement to continue if a
teacher n1ay continue to teach in the district in which he
is now employed even though salaries may be low. If
however the teacher is required to seek employment elsewhere it is an invitation to leave the state for higher
pay or start ane,v, leaving the teaching profession. It is
self-evident that a teacher who has spent twenty or thirty
years of his life in one district may not be able to secure
employment in another district either within

o~

without

the State of Utah. But if he must seek employment elsewhere and if he can find employment in the teaching
profession he may as easily find it outside of the State
of Utah. The arbitrary disqualification because of arelationship to one board member may very well be the
impelling force to cause a well-qualified teacher to seek
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
professional employn1ent in a state where he will not be
plagued with the problems of low salary and well-meaning relatives elected to boards of education.
II. ANTI-NEPOTISM STATUTE SHOULD BE CONSTRUED
SO AS NOT TO APPLY TO TEACHERS AND OTHER
EMPLOYEES OF BOARDS OF EDUCATION REQUIRED
BY LAW TO HAVE CERTIFICATES OR DIPLOMAS ISSUED BY THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.

Under Point No. I we have contended and it is still
our contention that the anti-nepotism statute as amended
by the 1953 Legislature is unconstitutional. This is for.
the reason that there is no specific exemption made. with
regard to employees of local hoards of education holding
certificates issued by the State Board of Education, and
the statute is not warranted under the. police power of
the state.
Nevertheless there is authority for the proposition
that the Legislature may not have intended to include
employees required by law to hold certificates as a
requisite to employment.

We submit the following

authorities on this question. For convenience we have
divided this argument into subheadings (a), (b) and
(c). As under Point No. I we think there is a logical
segregation of points but the

matte~rs

are necessarily

overlapping and authorities cited under one of these
subdivisions may be persuasive under another subdivision or under all three.
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(a) 1f so construed the anti-nepotism statute is in

conflict with Section 53-2-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
N<~etion 53-~-15,

after authorizing the State Board
() r l~:d ll('a t ion to issue certificates to professional teach(•r:-;, ~upervison.;, et('., provides:
"Su(·h certificates and diplomas shall be valid
in any school district of the state in the departnten t of instruction or supervision for which they
art· issued."
The anti-nepotisn1 statute as applied to employees
of local boards of education holding certificates from
the State Board of Education nullifies Section 53-2-15,
~ince the right to teach is denied the holder of the certificate in the districts \\'here there is a member of the
board related to the teacher within the degrees mentioned.
(b) Stat-utes 1nust be construed in the light of their
intent and purposes.

The case of State ex rel. Robinson vs. Keefe (Fla.

1933) 149 So. 638, is in our opinion directly in point. The
Florida statute involved in that case was as follows:
"Section 1. That any State Officer, membe·r
of State Board, County Officer, member of
County Board or Commission, City Official, or
his appointee, who shall knowingly employ, either
directly or indirectly, any p·erson related within
the fourth degree, either by consanguinity or by
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affinity, to such State Officer, me1nber of State
. Board, County Officer, 1nember of c·ounty Board
or Commission, (_'iity Official, or his appointee
shall be deemed guilty of 1nisfea.sance and malfeasance in office and subject to removal therefor.
Provided, ho,vever, that the provision of this Act
shall not apply to officers above who employ only
one person related to hin1 as above set out.
"S.ection 2. That any State Officer, member
of State Board, County Officer, member of
County Board or Con11nission, City Official, or
his appointee, violating the provisions of Section
One of this Act shall forfeit all compens~tion
salary, fees or emolmnents of such office during
the time that such State Officer, member of State
Board, County Officer, member of County Board
or c·ommission, City Official or his appointee
violates the provision of this Act.
"Section 3. All laws or parts of laws In
conflict herewith are hereby repealed."
As can be readily seen from the foregoing there
\Yas

no specific exception of school teachers. Section 3

of the foregoing act also stated that all laws in conflict
with the anti-nepotism statute "are hereby repealed."
The Florida laws, similar to our own laws, required
teachers to secure certificates from the state board of
education and the laws provided that such certificates
should be valid in all districts of the state. The court
made the following statement in exempting teachers
from the provisions of the anti-nepotism law:
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" 'N epotistn' has been defined as the bestowal
of 1>a tronage by public officers in appointing
othPrs to offices or positions by reason of their
hlood or marital relationship to the appointing
authority, rather than because of the merit or
ability of' the apvointee. The Florida act should
IH~ C'Onstrued in the light of its obvious purpose to
di:·woul'age 'nepotism' as above defined.
"And as so con trued, act~ of similar import
have been either definitely sustained as constitutional, or have been enforced by the courts without serious controversy as to their validity, in at
least two other states, although authorities relating to such statutes are few. See Barton v.
Alexander, 27 Idaho 286, 148 Pac. 471, Ann. Cas.
1917 D, 729; Redell v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. 199, 170
Par. 273; State ex rel. Ikard v. Russell, Judge,
33 Okla. 141, 124 Pac. 1092.
"The la-w"S of Florida relating to the nomination and employn1ent of school teachers are colnplete in then1selves. No intention is manifest in
the 1933 'anti-nepotis1n' law, above mentioned, to
repeal or 1nodi:fy the general school laws of this
state relating to exanrination, certification, and
e1nployment of only qualified school teachers on
the basis of their demonstrated merit as attested
by the fact of their certificates, as distinguished
from e·mployn1ent based largely on the basis of
the appointee's domestic relation, or relationship
by consanguinity or affinity, toward officers
vested with the appointing authority.
"Our construction of the school statutes is
that under these laws. teachers are required to be
appointed because of their demonstrated and
proved ability to teach, or because of their past
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practical experience in teaching, and not by reason
of their family status, or the usual political considerations that may apply to the ordinary civil
offices or positions which are permitted to be
filled at the discretion of the appointing power
as a means of personal reward to kins1nen or as
recon1pence to the politically faithful.
"So the reason for not applying a statute of
this kind to a class of appointees such as school
teachers, whose n1erit 1nust be established before
they are permitted to be employed at all, is found
in the fact that the Legislature has by other complete statutes not in terms modified or repealed
by this one, provided a special system for the
appointment and tenure of employment for school
teachers. The require1nents of this sepa.rate code
of la.ws afford adequate proteqtion aga.inst appointments other tha.n upon proved merit, which
is all that an (anti-nepotism' la.w can constitu.tionally be supposed to cover a.nd still remain
within the police power, under· the guise of which
it is enacted."
We also refer the court to the case of Hruntworth
vs. Tanner, 152 Pac. 526, at page 30 of this brief
where the court construed a statute with regard to
employment agencies as not applying to an agency
exclusively engaged in securing employment for teachers.
In the case of Golding vs. Schubach Optical Com.pa.ny, 93 Utah 32, 70 P. 2d. 871, injunction proceedings
had been commenced by the director of the Department
of Registration of the State of Utah against the defendants to prohibit the carrying on of the busine·ss of
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optoHlPtt·y whPre licensed optometrists were employed
by eorporations and the corporations advertised the perl'orulanee of this service. In holding that the corporation
<'ould carry on the business so long as the service was
a<·t ua1ly }Wrfortued by the licensed optometrist the court
~

't:d .

• (

J -

•

..rrhe right to Hell one's services, to accept
<'Blployinent at a ~alary, and the right to buy
another's serYice, to ernploy another at a salary,
are funda1nental rights, limited only by the terms
of the contract that may be made between the
parties, except where the work to be done is
fraught \\'"ith a public· interest, and the state has
spoken, and ~et the limitations necessary to protect the public interest.
"The state has spoken on the subject of
opto1netry and opto1netrists, not for the purpose
of conferring any special privilege upon optometists, nor to put any special restrictions upon them,
but to preserve and protect the public against
quacks and charlatans, who, however incompetent
they might be, \Vould prey upon the desire and
necessity of the people to protect their eyesight.
Chapter 11 of title 79, R.S. tTtah 1933 (the statute
referring to optometry), was enacted by the
Legislature because that body felt that the protection of eyesight was of public concern, and
one not qualified should not be permitted to examine eyes and diagnose and prescribe treatment, or
types of glasses, to cure the defe-cts, or preserve
the failing sight. The act mu.st therefore be construed in the light of the purzJoses back of its
enactm.en.t; that is, as a me-asure to protect the
health and eyesight of the p·eople, and when this
purpose is accomplished, it is not within the
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province or po,ver of the court to extend it beyond
such purposes; or to read into it son1ething not
designed to protect the public interest and health,
but to grant Inonopolies, regulate private business or relationships, grant special privile·ges, or
curtail the nor1nal hun1an rights and liberties."
The following statement is taken fron1 the case of
Uta.h Association. of Life Underwriters vs. Mountain
States Life lns1Jrance Company, 58 Utah 579, 200 Pac.
673 (at page 589 of the Utah Report):
"It is elementary doctrine in this jurisdiction
that statutes must be construed and applied in
furtherance of the purpose or obje.ct which
induced their adoption. That the statutes governing life insurance contracts must be liberally construed, and so as to protect the public, is held by
all the courts having statutes that are like or
similar to ours. See Joyce on Insurance ('2d Ed.)
Sec. 190e. The language of our statute is very
broad and comprehensive, and a mere cursory
reading of it discloses its dominant intent and
purpose. Moreover, we· have a right to assume
that every provision of the statute which is prohibitive in its effect is based upon some evil
which, in the minds of the Legislature, required
regulation. Then, again, it is manifest that the
statute was enacted for the protection of the public and especially for the protection of those who
are solicited to enter into life insurance contracts
who may lack the experience and the opportunity
to guard themselves against the wiles of the
experienced life insurance solicitor. The statute
should therefore be construed so as to accomplish
its purpose and so as to pTotect those it intends
to protect."
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(e) Where there a.re two possible constructions to
he given a statute one of which results in the

slal1de beinq held unconstitutional, the alternatin(~ construction should be given.
Th i ~ point is also emphasized in the case of H wntwurllt r.~,·. Tarnter eited at page 30 of this brief.
In tiH~ <·cu-;e of University of Utah vs. Richards, 20
TTtah -1-57, 59 J>a<·. 96, this court 1nade the following
sta te1nen t (at page -J.(;~) of the lT tah Report) :
.. The lR\\T makers did not see fit to embrace
in the latter any express words of repeal of the
forn1er act. If such former act is repealed, it must
be by i1nplication. If the acts are repugnant or
are so irreconcilably in conflict with each other
and cannot be harn1onized togethe·r, in order to
effectuate the purpose of their enactment, then
it n1ay be said the later act may by implication
repeal the for1ner. Repeals by implication, however, are not favored by the law. One act is not
to be allo,ved to defeat another if by reasonable
construction the two can be made to stand together.''
III. WHERE BOARD OF EDUCATION RECEIVES NO PAY
THE ANTI-NEPOTISM STATUTE IS NOT APPLICABLE.

To come 'vithin the literal wording of the antinepotism statute both the· employer and the employee
must be receiving pay out of public funds. The violation
of the statute is a misdemeanor. Being penal it must
be strictly construed. Members of boards of education
do not necessarily receive pay out of public funds.
S·ection 53-6-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides:
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~'Board

1nen1bers - Con1pensation and expenses.-The 1nen1bers of each board of education shall fix the con1pensation to be received for
their se rYices ; in city school districts at a su1n
not to exceed $100 each per annum; and in county
school districts at a Slun not to exceed $150 each
per annum and traveling expenses not to exceed
$100 each per annum; provided, in county school
districts any Ineinber living n1ore than 75 miles
from the place of 1neeting 1nay receive· not to
exceed $200 per annun1 for traveling expenses,
and each board n1ember shall be required to subInit an itemized account of traveling expenses,
sworn to by him and approved by the board."
This is not a situation where the school board
member is sin1ply refusing to accept his pay but the
school board itself, pursuant to statute·, must determine
what pay, if any, the members shall receive. As pointed
out in the statement of facts the Board of Education of
Ogden City has passed a resolution fixing the pay for
the me1nbe-rs of the board for the school year 1953-1954
at nothing. In the case of Tanner vs. Bateman, in addition to all of the arguments heretofore 1nade in this brief,
there is the argument that since the board members in
Ogden City will receive no pay the statute does not
cover employees of that board.
It may be argued that the last clause of the statute
relating only to the acceptance of employment by the
appointee does not require that both the board membe-r
and the employee be paid out of public funds. This
clause is as follows:
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and it is unlawful for such appointee to
ac·c·Ppt or to retain such e,mployrnent in all cases
where the dire~t power of employment or appointlltent to such position is or can be exercised by
any person within the degrees of consanguinity
or af'finit~, h<·rein specified, or by a board or
group of' \\·hi<·h such person is a member."
B

'1.,11<' \vords "suc·h position" refer to the first part of the
~Petion whjc·l1 spec-ifically states that the position is one
\\'heru hoth of the related persons must receive pay out
of public funds.
\Yhile there is no factual situation now before the
court involving the question of hiring employees not
required to hold certificates by the Board of Education
'vhere a 1ne1nber of the board is a relative of such
e1nployee, such personnel 1nay be affected by a ruling
of the court on the point herein presented.
CONCLUSION
It is the position of the plaintiff that the act of the
1953 Legislature in a1nending Section 52-3-1, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, is invalid as a violation of the stat~ and
federal constitutions and not within the police power
of the state. This for the reason that by its terms it
prohibits the e1nployment of teachers and other personnel
required by law to hold certificates issued by the, State
Board of Education and as to such employees there is
no basis in the interest of the public vvelfare to warrant
the interference with individual liberty and the right to
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seek employ1nent \Yherever a citizen uu1y choose. The
act of the Legislature is further unconstitutional as an
atten1pt to take fron1 the State Board of Edueation the
general control and supervision of the public school
system conferred by Section 8, Article X of our State
Constitution.
As a rnatter of statutory construction it n1ay be that
the Legislature did not intend Section 52-3-1 to apply to
school teachers and other personnel required by law to
secure certificates from the State Board of Education
as a prerequisite to being en1ployed by local boards of
education. If such construction be given to the antinepotism statute, plaintiffs (as in the case of unconstitutionality of the statute) are entitled to a writ of
mandamus requiring the respective local boards of education to enter into contracts for the year 1953-1954.
As a further basis for the ernployment of the
plaintiff ~Iathias C. Turner, his employment will constitute no violation of the anti-nepotism law for the
reason that 1nen1bers of the Board of Education of Ogden
City for the fiscal year 1953-1954 will be entitled to
receive no compensation from public funds.
Respectfully submitted,
MARR., WILKINS & CANNON,
PAUL B. C.ANNON,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
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